The U.S. Navy’s Transition to Jets

In this centennial year of naval aviation, it is interesting to observe that it has been jet powered for over half of its history. The transition was long and brutally expensive in terms of life and aircraft. However, it was, by any measure, a success

Connecting the Dots: Capital Ships, the Littoral, Command of the Sea, and the World Order

The geopolitical competitors of the United States are seeking ways to nullify the American capability to influence and intervene that the aircraft carrier confers. Understanding the linkages helps us refine and enhance the debate about what to do

The Future of The Future of Aircraft Carriers

As the geopolitical, technological, and budgetary environments change, the question of whether aircraft carriers will still be needed, and if so of what kind and how many, becomes urgent. The best way to approach it is in terms of how they are actually used and how they could be

Exporting Security - China, the United States, and the Innovator’s Dilemma

China’s emergence as an economic and military power has absorbed considerable energy on the part of U.S. policy and strategy makers and pundits. One of the big questions is whether China will be content as a regional hegemon with global interests or will seek to displace the United States as the primary global power

Gettysburg and Midway: Historical Parallelsin Operational Command

The purpose of this study is to show the profound effect a commander in chief’s approach to operational command can have on the course of events in war. It does so by analyzing the performance of two operational l lev el commanders in chief, General Robert E. Lee, commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy Combined Fleet, during the defining campaign of their respective careers. These specific battles are selected to demonstrate that the requirements of operational-level command transcend time, technology, and environment. Additionally, it is in the study of the losing commanders that the most compelling lessons can be drawn. The picture that emerges is an endorse ment of Carl von Clausewitz\u27s notion that there are no hard and fast rules that govern the conduct of war; it is the presence of the commander that decisively influences the course of events-for better or worse

The Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm

The U.S. Navy finds itself on the cusp of a shift in the makeup and use of its forces as fundamental as that from sail to steam or from the battleship to the aircraft carrier. The shift has, in fact, already begun. Is the Navy truly ready and willing to take the next steps

Research & Debate—The Medium Is the Message: Weaving Wargaming More Tightly into the Fabric of the Navy

By now, the challenge and threat of a rising and contentious China and an increasingly hostile Russia have penetrated the Navy’s corporate consciousness, and current leaders are taking steps to shift the service from a purely power- projection posture to one that focuses again on defending American command of the sea. The Navy is initiating adjustments to fleet design and architecture as well as a rebirth of fleet experimentation. While perhaps late in coming, these responses to the emergent challenges of our time are encouraging

Writing to Think

The purpose of this volume is to honor the work and thought of Robert C. Rubel, Captain, U.S. Navy (Ret.). Since his retirement from the Navy, Robert (a.k.a. “Barney”) Rubel has held senior positions in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS), in the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island—first as deputy dean, then as chairman of the War Gaming Department, and finally (since 2006) as dean. During this period, not only has he presided effectively over a complex (and in many ways anomalous) institution, but he has found the time to create a substantial body of published writings about naval warfare and war, or strategy generally. In the process, he has quietly established himself as one of the Navy’s most innovative and wide-ranging thinkers.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1040/thumbnail.jp

A Dazzling Vision of Antiseptic Warfare

The Chief of Air Force history, Dr. Richard P. Hallion, has written a book about Operation Desert Shield-Desert Storm that embodies the thesis that simply (if boldly) stated, air power won the Gulf War. He argues that advances in technology have enabled air power to fulfill the promise of a former generation of visionaries; that air power can win wars by itself. Dr. Hallion conducts an analysis of the Gulf War to marshall evidence for his view